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SPECIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON THE
LIMITATION OF RIGHTS. Grégoire C.N. Webber.1
Cambridge University Press. 2009. Pp. viii + 231. $95.00.
John Oberdiek

2

Ours is an age of rights. The language of rights permeates
moral and political discourse. What rights we have, and what it
means to have them, are matters of public debate that are as
familiar as they are vital. Discussions of free expression, privacy,
or abortion, for example, are almost always cast in terms of the
rights to free expression, privacy, and abortion. And it is not
hard to explain, at least in part, why this is so. A political culture
revolving around rights is cultivated and sustained by a
constitutional democracy. There are at least two reasons for this.
First, constitutions themselves give pride of place to rights.
Constitutions define a political framework whose guarantees are
defined as rights. Second, rights flourish in constitutional
democracies because they serve as a lingua franca. They provide
a single recognized and seemingly stable normative currency
when the moral pluralism characteristic of democracies might
otherwise threaten the possibility of there being any common
coin whatsoever. Constitutional democracies like ours create and
support a culture of rights, then, due to the twin natures and
attendant pressures of constitutionalism and democracy.
This explanation of the importance of rights in a
constitutional democracy, though, illuminates neither what
constitutional rights themselves are nor how—to say nothing of
how well—they play the role they are assigned within our
political culture. Indeed, by conceiving of constitutional rights as
guarantees and as a stable normative currency, the explanation
can mislead. It can lend itself to a facile picture of constitutional
rights that no one accepts, in which the constitutional status of
1. Lecturer in Law, London School of Economics.
2. Professor, Rutgers School of Law - Camden.
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any legislation or conduct can be determined just by invoking
abstract rights. Things are not so simple. Constitutional rights
may be guarantees, but not against everything; rights may also
serve as a stable common currency, but the currency is not fixed
and inflexible. There is no democratic constitutional regime
whose practices suggest otherwise. In fact, most democratic
constitutions or international charters of rights explicitly
incorporate what is known as a limitations clause (or a set of
tailored ones) that qualifies the rights there established. This is
true of, for example, the European Convention on Human
Rights, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the
German Basic Law, the South African Bill of Rights, and the
New Zealand Bill of Rights. The Canadian Charter is
representative, guaranteeing its enumerated rights “subject only
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
3
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” The
Canadian Charter and other similar fundamental legal
instruments recognize rights, then, but only in tandem with a
limitations clause. The rights are necessarily subject to whatever
constraints the clause articulates. Interestingly, the United States
Constitution is the exception that proves the rule, if it is an
exception at all: its Bill of Rights contains no express limitations
clause, and yet the Supreme Court, of course, interprets the
rights contained therein to be limited in various ways, which is
why even the First Amendment does not protect, say,
incitements to imminent violence or child pornography. This
suggests that a limitations clause simply makes explicit what is
already implicit whenever rights are invoked, namely, that rights
are limited in scope.
Granting that constitutional and other charter rights are
typically guaranteed subject to an express limitations clause,
what does it mean to say that they are so qualified and what can
we learn about constitutions and constitutionalism more
generally by reflecting on the ubiquity and role of limitations
clauses? In The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of
Rights, Grégoire C. N. Webber offers contrarian answers to
these questions with an ambitious reconceptualization of
constitutions and their rights. His primary target is “the received
approach” to limitations clauses, and its sins are many, according
to Webber:

3. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
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It endorses an overzealous definition of rights, which results
in rights-claims to everything thereby prompting almost all
legislation (and State action more generally) to conflict with
some right. In consequence, there are frequent, and indeed
expected and unavoidable conclusions that rights have been
infringed. Yet, countless rights-infringements are, as a matter
of course, justified, with the result that it is now a governing
assumption of the received approach that rights are not
absolute and that they are generally opposed to or in
competition with the public interest. The definition of a right
is determined on the basis of the individual claimant’s interest
alone and does not take into account other rights or
considerations not part of the right’s purpose; these
considerations are all relegated to the limitation clause
analysis. . . . That analysis—considered to be primar[il]y if not
exclusively a judicial undertaking—draws on a ‘balancing of
interests’ and a requirement of ‘proportionality’ between the
right and the limitation, which is informed by evidence and
(albeit only ostensibly) political morality (p. 88).

Webber rejects the received approach, root and branch. He
rejects what he believes is the false technicality of its
proportionality and balancing analyses, its hyper-individualistic
conception of rights, its denigration of popular legislation as
inherently antagonistic to rights and concomitant worship of the
judiciary, and its denial that rights are absolute. But the received
approach errs most fundamentally, on his view, in its
“overzealous definition of rights” (p. 88).
Its definition of rights is overzealous, at bottom, because of
overreaching: according the received approach, if a constitution
or charter grants a right to free expression, for example, then
everything that counts as expression is subsumed by the right. No
normative distinctions are made, at this stage, between protected
and unprotected expression. The received approach thus takes
the generality of the formulation of rights literally, as entailing
universal application—one’s right is to free expression, not to
some free expression. This is the crux of the first of Webber’s
complaints about the received approach’s understanding of
rights. Given how capaciously the model construes rights,
legislation will almost always tread upon someone’s right to
something, and that gives the legislative process—and
democracy more broadly—a bad name. At a minimum,
construing rights as the received approach does regularly forces
a choice between our commitment to rights and our commitment
to democracy.
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Webber’s second complaint about the received approach’s
conception of rights is closely related. He contends that its
overzealous definition of rights actually robs rights of the
normative force that is widely held to distinguish them. This is
evident, according to Webber, in the two-stage analysis of
constitutionality necessitated by the approach’s allencompassing model of rights: one determines, first, whether a
right has been infringed and, only if one has been, whether the
infringement is justified according to the limitations clause. It is
therefore the limitations clause, taken up at the second stage of
the inquiry, and not the antecedently-defined right, that does (at
least the majority of) the justificatory work. Defining the right or
determining what constitutes the right is, on this view, a
straightforward
empirical
exercise
of
interpretation.
Determining whether some conduct is covered by a right to free
expression, for example, requires determining (only) whether
the conduct in question counts as expression, which is just a
matter of interpretive fact. Even concluding that some conduct is
expression and is therefore covered by the right, however, entails
nothing about whether that conduct is actually protected by the
right. In distinguishing between coverage and protection in this
way, Webber charges, the received approach reveals that rights
themselves lack normative purchase. For whether a right
actually protects anything, and does not merely cover it, is a
function of the content of the independent limitations clause, not
of the right itself. Webber thus indicts the received approach for
underplaying the normative force of rights.
Webber’s most fundamental positive thesis, in contrast, is
that constitutional rights are actually constituted by their
accompanying limitations clause. On the view he endorses, it
makes no sense to distinguish and lexically order defining the
right and assessing the justifiability of its abridgement. Instead,
according to Webber, the very definition of a right draws upon
those multifarious considerations that the received approach
reserves to the second stage of its analysis, concerning the
limitations clause. What is reserved to the second stage of
analysis under the received approach, in other words, gets folded
into the first stage under Webber’s approach, so that one cannot
define a right without knowing the right’s limitations—what it
does and does not protect or entitle one to. The definition of any
right, in this way, incorporates the conditions of its permissible
contravention.
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Conceptualizing rights this way, Webber contends,
addresses the two chief shortcomings of the received approach.
First, if rights are defined so as not to conflict with justified
limitations on them, then legislation will not, as a matter of
course, be antagonistic to rights. For if legislative enactments are
justified—and surely many of them are—they will necessarily not
conflict with anyone’s rights. The happy upshot is that no choice
is forced between democracy and rights. Second, if rights are
constituted by their limitations, then rights themselves have a
normative heft that they lack under the received approach.
Having a right, on this view, entails having conclusive normative
protection against some treatment or a conclusive entitlement to
something. Insofar as the received approach treats rights as
descriptive empirical categories, it fails to do justice to the
normativity or prescriptivity of rights. Webber offers a corrective
to this conceptual shortcoming: to retain the normativity of
constitutional rights, their very definition must incorporate their
limitations, and those are (often) conveniently marked out in a
limitations clause.
So conceived, the definition of constitutional rights is more
open-ended than the received approach admits. The limitations
clauses upon which the definition of constitutional rights depend
are, after all, themselves open-ended. The Canadian Charter’s
limitations clause, which again allows limits on rights that “can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society,”
surely provides for a great deal of latitude in determining how to
limit the rights it recognizes, even as it focuses the inquiry on the
values of freedom and democracy. For the ideal of a free and
democratic society is an abstract and open-textured one. This
does not mean that rights cannot be misconstrued or limited in
ways that are mistaken or just plain wrong. Latitude is not
license. Webber makes this clear when he maintains that “the
improper limitation of a right poses a challenge to the political
legitimacy of the State.” (p. 18) Still, there is no single proper
limitation. There are only values or principles, many of which
are incommensurable, that must be heeded and given due regard
in limiting constitutional rights. And while different extant
limitations clauses may cite various legitimating considerations,
Webber believes that two general principles are paramount,
underlying all sound limitations clauses and thus all legitimate
constitutions: “the principle of democracy” (p. 18), which
emphasizes popular sovereignty, and “the principle of human
rights” (p. 21), which captures those basic rights not subject to
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4

majoritarian control. Even these, however, are merely
regulative principles and do not dictate any single correct
limitation on constitutional rights. Discretion and judgment are
unavoidable.
This prompts Webber to re-imagine constitutional rights
and constitutions themselves as negotiable: “[t]he constitution of
a democratic constitutional State, and especially constitutional
rights, ought to remain open, on an on-going basis, for
democratic re-negotiating” (p. 13). If constitutional rights are
not static and wooden as on the received approach, but dynamic
and entirely compatible with justifiable legislation as Webber
argues, then a constitution and the rights it recognizes can be
cast and recast as circumstances on the ground and normative
commitments change. And in a democracy, Webber contends,
negotiating and re-negotiating rights is the job of the legislature.
Webber’s is thus a form of common law constitutionalism in
which the constitution is regarded as itself an “activity,” but with
the legislature playing the role that the common law reserves for
judges. Indeed, it is Webber’s view, following Jeremy Waldron
and others, that “[t]he legislature alone is in a position to be
both an authority constituted by the constitution as well as an
authority with the political legitimacy to re-negotiate the
constitution—that is, to (continue to) be a constituent authority”
(p. 149). The discretion that is inescapably called for in limiting
constitutional rights and in assessing those limitations is thus
properly exercised by, and only by, the people’s elected
representatives.
Much as a court lacks plenary authority to adjudicate more
than the case before it and so will not completely specify the
contours of any particular right at one fell swoop, however, “the
legislature . . . does not, in the normal case, take it upon itself to
engage completely with the limitation of a right. It rather seeks
to delimit a right by legislating certain aspects of the limitation
of that right, from time to time” (p. 171). Envisioning only
piecemeal legislative limitations of rights, Webber echoes Cass
Sunstein and likens the constitution itself to an incompletely
theorized agreement. The agreement is, however, always
provisional. For “[t]he legislature is free to change, even
radically, the legislative limitation of a constitutional right over

4. See also p. 182, where Webber maintains: “With the exception of the European
Convention’s appeal to ‘necessity’, the idea of justification in a free and democratic
society animates the question of a right’s limitation in all limitation clauses.”
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time, from one generation to the next, from one election to the
next, even from one sitting of the legislature to the next”
(p. 175). A constitution is indeed an activity, and quite possibly a
constant one.
There is a good deal that is attractive in Webber’s picture of
constitutional rights, constitutions, and constitutionalism. Its
originality lies in the way he combines existing but seemingly
unrelated positions into a single multi-faceted theory. As
Webber’s theory is a synthesis of positions that others, including
5
the present author, have developed in greater depth, however, it
cannot help but have a derivative feel in places. Webber could
have advanced debate further and avoided this criticism had he
endeavored to develop the constituent positions that his overall
view comprises instead of just helping himself to them as if they
were store bought. There was a missed opportunity here. Still,
the synthesis itself is indeed novel and, I think, a real
contribution to the literature on constitutional theory. In the
remainder of this discussion, my primary aim is to explore how
successful Webber is in applying the specified theory of rights,
which I have defended in other contexts, to constitutional law.
While I think Webber needs to tread more carefully in places,
overall I find his account of constitutional rights appealing.
Let me begin by very briefly summarizing the theory of
rights, called the specified conception of rights or
specificationism, which I have defended and that Webber
explicitly incorporates as the central plank of his overall
6
platform. It will be largely familiar from the above synopsis of
Webber’s view, which hews quite closely to my own view about
rights. In contrast to what I referred to as the general conception
of rights, which “first identifies the content of whatever right is
at issue and only then determines what the right’s normative
implications are in the circumstances,” I held that
5. Webber draws heavily from my work on the theory of rights, quoting from my
papers at length and generally echoing many of their points in the keystone chapter,
“Constituting Rights by Limitation,” and citing them in twenty-three footnotes over
thirty pages (pp. 116–46). Those papers are John Oberdiek, Lost in Moral Space: On the
Infringing/Violating Distinction and its Place in the Theory of Rights, 23 LAW & PHIL. 325
(2004); John Oberdiek, Specifying Rights Out of Necessity, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
127 (2008) [hereinafter, Oberdiek, Specifying]; and John Oberdiek, What’s Wrong with
Infringements (Insofar as Infringements are Not Wrong): A Reply, 27 LAW & PHIL. 293
(2008) [hereinafter, Oberdiek, What’s Wrong].
6. I am not the first to defend this theory. The most famous invocation of it comes
in Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971). As it
happens, Thomson later renounced her specificationism. I discuss this in Oberdiek
What’s Wrong, supra note 5, at 293–94.
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specificationism “identifies the content of a right in light of and
indeed in response to what is justifiable to do under the
circumstances . . . so as not to conflict in the first place with
7
justifiable behaviour.” Rights might be stated in general terms,
on my view, but rights actually are specified, so that the
seemingly general right not to be killed, for example, which
reads as a right not to be killed full stop, is truly the right not to
be killed unjustly. I supported this conclusion with arguments
too involved to repeat here, but which can be gleaned from
Webber’s discussion—specificationism makes better sense of the
way we argue towards rights and neither reifies nor renders
rights redundant, for starters.
The foregoing overview underlines the striking parallel in
the structures of both the received approach to constitutional
rights and the general conception of rights simpliciter, as well as
Webber’s and my respective contrary positions. Both the
received approach to constitutional rights and the general
conception of rights analytically distinguish the question of what
a right itself is from the question of what a right calls for in any
particular case. Both views, in other words, hold that rights can
be defined independently of their justified abridgement and both
also hold that rights can be justifiably abridged. On the former
view, it is primarily legislation that tests the right, and one looks
to a limitations clause to see if the potentially offending
legislation can, in the circumstances, be justified in the clause’s
terms. On the latter view, it is conduct of any kind that tests the
right, and one looks to normative facts to determine whether, in
the circumstances, the potentially offending conduct is
compatible with the right. Webber’s and my respective views, in
turn, collapse these two stages: Webber maintains that
constitutional rights are constituted by their limitations clause,
while I contend that rights are specified so not to conflict with
morally justifiable conduct.
The relationship between the received approach and
Webber’s view, on the one hand, and the general conception of
rights and specificationism, on the other, is thus analogous. But
the two antithetical pairs of views are not identical. What the
two conventional views part over, and what Webber and I part
over, is the standard for abridging an antecedently defined right,
as the conventional views would have it, or, as Webber and I
would put it, for defining the content of the right itself. The
7. Oberdiek, Specifying, supra note 5, at 128 (quoted in part by Webber at p. 131).
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received approach and Webber’s alternative to it appeal
exclusively to a posited, if open-textured, limitations clause. The
general conception of rights as well as the specificationism that I
endorse look instead to normative considerations wherever and
whatever they might be. This difference is due to the fact that
Webber’s focus is constitutional legal rights while mine is moral
rights and, at one remove, common law rights. And it is that
difference that gives me pause in signing on to Webber’s
application of specificationism to constitutional law.
The relationship between legality and morality is, of course,
a source of continuing inquiry and puzzlement in general
jurisprudence, and the difficulty of cleanly distinguishing
between the two when rights are at issue is especially difficult.
This is because moral rights are particularly legalistic. H. L. A.
Hart suggests as much in maintaining, “the concept of a right
belongs to that branch of morality which is specifically
concerned to determine when one person’s freedom may be
limited by another’s and so to determine what actions may
8
appropriately be made the subject of coercive legal rules.”
Moral rights, one might say, are law-apt. Moral rights are
nevertheless distinct from legal rights, and a fortiori from
constitutional rights, and what makes for a compelling account
of moral rights does not necessarily make for as compelling an
account of constitutional rights.
A distinguishing feature of specificationism, which Webber
locates and finds attractive in his own account of constitutional
rights, is its dynamism. A right of free expression, again for
example, may protect this kind of speech but not that kind, or
the same kind of speech in some circumstances but not others.
The moral right of free expression (as well as every other moral
right) is, in this way, entirely context-dependent. According to
specificationism, unless all the considerations that are relevant to
the justifiability of expressing oneself in a given way in a given
context are brought to bear, the right of free expression is simply
indeterminate. Ascribing to someone a right of free expression,
full stop, is therefore tendentious. There are just too many ways
and too many contexts in which one may not express oneself
however one sees fit to make so sweeping a declaration. Moral
rights as a class, as they are understood on the specified
conception of rights, cannot be the carte blanche that the general
conception of rights assumes them to be.
8. H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 177 (1955).
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There is much that can be said in response to these claims,
to be sure, but the question I wish to pursue is whether Webber’s
embrace of this dynamism about constitutional rights is
advisable and appropriate. An implication of specificationism’s
dynamism is that one argues towards and not from rights. For if
rights themselves are conditional in the way that specificationism
entails, then rights cannot be invoked in arguing for a normative
conclusion. That would beg the question. A right is not a
consideration to be factored into an all-things-considered
judgment of what is permissible, according to specificationism, it
rather represents the all-things-considered conclusion about
permissibility. And conclusions are what we argue towards.
Of course, as a matter of actual practice, it will make a great
deal of sense to appeal to rights in moral or legal argument.
Rights stated in general terms are useful placeholders. When
invoked this way, they purport to summarize the balance of a
common subset (but only a subset) of considerations that bear
on what people are ultimately entitled to do. Even if specified at
some deep level, general rights can thus play a helpful heuristic
role in normative argument. It would be unreasonable to expect
people to start from scratch, beginning with normative primitives
and working their way up, every time they actually engage in
9
normative argument. Rights conceived this way are a kind of
normative shortcut. Now, Webber endorses my criticism that
rights conceived generally are merely intermediate conclusions
about what is permissible and are not, as under specificationism,
the final conclusions that we really seek about what is ultimately
permissible. If what ultimately matters are the duties that our
rights actually impose, then the general conception of rights
cannot be the correct theory, for the normative power of general
rights is always subject to further context-specific considerations.
But this philosophical vice has its virtues, and one of them is
practicality, whether the rights at issue are moral or legal. So
long as we all know what we are all doing in appealing to baldly
stated rights that appear to lack any express qualifications, like
“the right of free expression” or “the right to privacy,” there is
no problem. Webber need not disagree.
A different kind of pragmatic consideration, however, might
seem to drive a wedge between moral and constitutional rights,

9. I make this point in Oberdiek, Specifying, supra note 5, at 133: “As a practical
matter, it is of course useful to advert to rights as a way of holding constant the
multifarious considerations that justify a particular right.”
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suggesting that specificationism is not the best account of
constitutional rights, even if it is the best account of moral rights.
On the best account of constitutional rights, in other words, one
might in fact argue from them, even if one only argues towards
specified moral rights. Although he does not distinguish between
kinds of rights in the following passage, Joseph Raz captures
why this might be so:
Assertions of rights are typically intermediate conclusions in
arguments from ultimate values to duties. . . . The fact that
practical arguments proceed through the mediation of
intermediate stages so that not every time a practical question
arises does one refer to ultimate values for an answer is . . . of
crucial importance in making social life possible, not only
because it saves time and tediousness, but primarily because it
enables a common culture to be formed round shared
intermediate conclusions, in spite of a great degree of
10
haziness and disagreement concerning ultimate values.

Raz here mentions the first pragmatic consideration canvassed
above, that general rights are a convenient handmaiden in
practical reasoning, but it is the second that is key; namely, that
rights conceived generally make social life possible in a
pluralistic society precisely because they only state intermediate
conclusions that prescind from their fundamental justifying
values. How might this observation counsel against specifying
constitutional rights?
One need not claim that politics and law are discontinuous
with morality to recognize that norms governing the former
domains need to be public in a way that moral norms need not
be. Morality is, first and foremost, a system of norms governing
individual conduct, after all, while politics and law are systems of
norms governing collective and social conduct. The truth about
moral rights therefore need not answer to the demands of
publicity to the extent or in the way that the truth about
constitutional rights must. The content of any moral right
depends on belief-independent moral facts along with empirical
facts about circumstances. The moral facts are the moral facts,
the empirical facts are the empirical facts, and controversy or
uncertainty about either is usually irrelevant. The same cannot
be said of an analogous politically legitimate constitutional right.
The content of any politically legitimate constitutional right
surely does depend, in part, on what people generally take the
10. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 181 (1986).
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moral status of the relevant conduct to be and the relevant nonmoral facts to be. Controversy is not irrelevant here. For no
constitutional framework can be politically legitimate (which is
not to say just or legally valid) if the norms it enshrines take no
stock of the beliefs, moral or non-moral, held by the people
whom the constitution purports to govern. This puts a unique
pressure on constitutional rights—they are held to a standard
that moral rights are not.
Raz’s observation suggests that rights conceived generally,
as intermediate conclusions about one’s entitlements, offer a
way of deflecting this pressure and meeting this additional
standard because they focus attention on what we agree about—
the existence of some broadly-stated right—and away from what
we likely disagree about: namely, the exact implications of the
right and the fundamental moral considerations that justify it.
General rights, like alcohol, thus serve as a kind of social
lubrication. They allow people with diverse moral outlooks to
share common moral standards, even if only in the abstract,
which facilitate social life because no one need either commit up
front to an exhaustive set of conclusive duties or display their
deepest normative commitments. They can just focus on the
widely shared intermediate conclusions represented by general
rights, no matter how contestably those intermediate conclusions
might be applied in practice or were reached. This is the way in
which general rights serve as a lingua franca, noted at the outset.
They are like poker chips in Monte Carlo: one can purchase
them with any number of diverse currencies and everyone
recognizes their universal value regardless of the currency used
to buy them. Raz appears to believe that this function is an
important desideratum of any type of rights, but I would submit
that in light of the distinctive publicity concerns canvassed
above, it applies only to legal rights and especially to
constitutional rights.
This, in turn, seems to entail that the received approach to
constitutional rights has more going for it than Webber
recognizes. Raz’s observation, suitably focused on constitutional
rights, suggests that there is good reason not to elide the
distinction between the definition of a constitutional right and its
limitation. Specified constitutional rights, the argument goes,
would fail to take the social dimension of those rights seriously.
That generally conceived constitutional rights are mere
intermediate conclusions about one’s entitlements and not final
conclusions about them is not the shortcoming that it is in the
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case of moral rights, which need not be sensitive to the demands
of publicity. Quite the contrary, it is a credit to the view,
counting in favor of the received approach to constitutional
rights. And that seems correct. For this reason, Webber is
perhaps too quick to apply specificationism to constitutional
rights. The case for specificationism cannot be transposed from
moral rights to constitutional rights as straightforwardly as he
seems to think.
This is not to say, however, that specificationism about
constitutional rights is misguided. Any credit that is due to the
received approach for its doubly pragmatic conception of rights
is surely defeasible. What must be shown is that the social
benefit of understanding constitutional rights as intermediate
conclusions is more mirage than reality. I believe that
specificationism has the resources to expose the received
approach on this point, so that Webber can at the end of the day
rightfully adopt a specificationist account of constitutional rights.
Andrei Marmor is instructive here. Discussing general
constitutional rights and their intermediary role, Marmor first
makes the Razian point that “[s]ocieties where different groups
of people are deeply divided about their conceptions of the
good, need to settle on a set of rights they can all acknowledge,
in spite of deep controversies regarding the grounds of those
11
rights (and their ramifications).” Still, he argues, rights so
understood represent very tenuous agreements that fall apart at
crucial junctures. To determine the limitation of a right, Marmor
explains, “one would naturally need to go back to the reasons for
having the right in the first place, and it is precisely at this point
that agreement breaks down. As a matter of fact, more often
than not we will discover that there was never an agreement
12
there to begin with.” It is precisely when rights must be limited
or specified more precisely and duties actually imposed, then,
that rights understood as consensual intermediate conclusions
give out. The veil of generality and abstraction is lifted in such
cases, revealing not deeper agreement about the right, but a
cacophony of arguments from contentious first premises to
controversial alleged duties.
The weakness of general constitutional rights on this score
can be illustrated by two kinds of cases. The first, which appears
11. ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 152 (2d ed. 2005),
excerpted in ARGUING ABOUT LAW 401, 409 (Aileen Kavanagh & John Oberdiek eds.,
2009).
12. Id.
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to be the type Marmor has in mind, is one where there is indeed
agreement in the abstract, but not at a foundational level. We
might all agree that there is a right of free expression, for
example, but not agree about the nature of its justification.
Despite our disparate grounds for recognizing the right, what
consensus there is enables us to apply the right in a wide range
of cases, and more specifically, just so long as the differing
justifications share the same implications in particular cases. But
therein lies the problem. As soon as a controversy arises that
commands no univocal resolution, but instead elicits different
proposed dispositions reflecting the different grounds people
have for recognizing the right of free expression, those contested
underlying justifications move to the fore and all semblance of
agreement disappears. What is left is unencumbered first-order
normative argument, not from consensual place-holding
constitutional rights, as the received approach envisions, but
towards constitutional rights, as specificationism holds. In such a
case, one cannot avoid arguing towards and specifying the
constitutional right of free expression by adjudging competing
conceptions of the point and value of free expression, like the
Millian “marketplace of ideas” account or the non-instrumental
autonomy-based one. A final if controversial disposition is
required, which will likely be based on equally controversial
premises. Hard cases may make bad law, but we must still settle
them. Whatever settlement is made, moreover, by definition
designates conclusive rights and duties, even if the settlement
could not likely gain everyone’s acceptance. Rights understood
in this specified way remain a lingua franca to the extent that
everyone knows what it means to have a right and to be subject
to a duty, even though there may be little consensus about the
content of those forms.
There is a second sort of case that counts against the
received approach’s embrace of general rights even more
pointedly, and that is one where there never was any consensus,
intermediate or otherwise, about there being a right at all. The
best exemplar of such a state of affairs is the debate surrounding
the constitutional right to an abortion in the United States. No
one can deny that there is such a constitutional right—as a
matter of positive law, it is beyond doubt—but there is nowhere
near universal popular support for it. Consequently, “the right to
an abortion” cannot be the placeholder that the received
approach requires, facilitating inquiry into narrower questions
like the potential right to a late-term abortion. Attorneys who
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argue against the constitutionality of late-term abortion in court
will of course address Roe and Casey in their briefs, but that
recognition falls far short of the image that the received
approach promotes, in which Roe and Casey state intermediate
conclusions that hold our society together and from which more
specific conclusions can be drawn. Constitutional norms can only
hold a society together in this way if they are widely accepted,
but when it comes to abortion in the United States, that wide
acceptance is absent. Indeed, if attorneys arguing against the
constitutionality of late-term abortion before the Supreme Court
do not believe (or if their clients do not believe) that Roe and
Casey were themselves correctly decided, they may just as likely
attack those precedents directly as attempt to accommodate or
parry them. The received approach makes no space for this kind
of dissent. This is because the controversy surrounding abortion
rights entails that they cannot serve as placeholders, as the
received approach requires of rights. The right to an abortion, on
that view, is therefore a kind of aberration—a constitutional
right in name only. This is sufficient reason to reject the received
approach, for despite the controversy surrounding abortion,
there is nevertheless a bona fide constitutional right to an
abortion in the United States.
It is worth adding that the received approach is not saved by
the fact that the United States Supreme Court locates the
constitutional right to an abortion under the more abstract
rubric of privacy, support for which is far more widespread. For
no one who cares about the constitutional status of abortion is
fooled into thinking that a broader debate about the widely
accepted right to privacy will yield agreement about the
constitutionality of abortion. If anything, subsuming the
constitutional right to an abortion under the right to privacy
jeopardizes the consensus about that latter right’s constitutional
status. If privacy grounds the right to an abortion and one
steadfastly believes that there should be no constitutional right
to an abortion, one could argue that privacy does not deserve the
protection that the Supreme Court affords it—one person’s
modus ponens is another’s modus tollens. Going abstract in the
way the received approach counsels, in short, just does not work
when it comes to resolving constitutional controversies about
matters that have never commanded consensus.
Specificationism can tolerate disagreement about
constitutional rights in a way that the received approach cannot.
This is because specificationism treats constitutional rights as
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conclusive determinations of entitlements and duties. That there
may be little agreement along the way towards those
conclusions, or about the conclusions themselves, does not
undermine the very idea of there being constitutional rights
under specificationism as it clearly does under the received
approach. Nothing in this argument, moreover, depends on a
claim that law is in general controversial. As a general matter, no
one should deny that there is widespread agreement about the
law, but the above examples illustrate that there can also be
deep disagreements, especially with respect to constitutional
rights. What deep disagreements there are must be theoretically
accommodated by an account of constitutional rights.
Specificationism, but not the received approach, does this.
Specificationism maintains that constitutional rights are hardfought final, if potentially narrow, conclusions that entail duties,
not intermediate conclusions of broad compass that command
widespread acceptance, as the received approach holds. That
latter picture fails to account for too many authentic
constitutional rights.
Webber is therefore right to endorse specified constitutional
rights and reject the received approach. Yet while I can
ultimately join him in supporting the idea of specified
constitutional rights, I cannot accept Webber’s particular
conception of them. In brief, and as noted above, Webber takes
an unapologetically Waldronian line, holding that the legislature
should be both the source and judge of any limitation on rights:
the legislature both “is not only a possible, but in many respects
a necessary author of a right’s limitation” (p. 150), and “should
be identified as the judge of the proper limitation against which
to evaluate the legislature’s limitation on a constitutional right”
(p. 179). He parts with Waldron only in supporting some judicial
review, albeit a very weak form, in which a legislative limitation
on a constitutional right could be overruled only for a “clear
mistake” (p. 209), and then only after grudgingly accepting that
the practice exists, lamenting that “[w]e may regret the advent of
judicial review” (p. 203). In these closing lines, my aim is simply
to point out that specificationism about constitutional rights
need not end up where Webber takes it, and secondarily to
suggest that Webber’s destination is not a place one should want
to end up.
“Who decides?” is a question that always looms large in
law, and any account of the limitation of constitutional rights
must answer it. Webber boldly answers that it is the legislature
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that ought to decide both how to limit any right initially and
whether that limitation is proper upon further review. The
arguments that he gives for the lofty status he accords the
13
legislature are familiar chiefly from Waldron’s work. But while
Webber follows Waldron in taking very seriously the so-called
circumstances of politics—the fact of intractable normative
disagreement—and contends that a thorough majoritarianism is
the only plausible response to it, he nowhere addresses the many
compelling challenges that have been put to Waldron on that
score, which I will simply gesture towards. The most
fundamental of these is well-stated by Aileen Kavanagh: “if
disagreement about the best means of protecting rights is the
ground on which we should reject the institution of judicial
review, then it is difficult to see why it does not impugn
14
participatory majoritarianism on the very same grounds.” The
fact of normative disagreement, in short, cannot drive one to an
all-encompassing majoritarianism given that it, too, fails to
command anything like universal support. Nor does Webber
consider Cécile Fabre’s powerful objection to Waldron that
putting rights against the state and its legislative whims beyond
the reach of everyday democratic politics is the only way of
providing the protection that is owed to the autonomous persons
15
who ideally populate a democracy. Nor does he engage with
rejoinders like David Estlund’s, suggesting that Waldron must
value the substantive outcomes and not just the procedure of
unbridled majoritarianism—what, after all, is the point of
valorizing reasoned democratic debate if not that it portends
16
better legislative conclusions? Webber’s refusal to address
these and other criticisms—and there is a not-so-small cottage
industry devoted to responding to Waldron’s work on
democracy—amounts, in my view, to a considerable omission.
Whether adequately argued for or not, though, the question
remains: does specificationism itself require that constitutional
rights be limited and/or reviewed through majoritarian
procedures?

13. See especially Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional
Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18 (1993), and Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the
Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2005).
14. Aileen Kavanagh, Participation and Judicial Review: A Reply to Jeremy
Waldron, 22 LAW & PHIL. 451, 467 (2003).
15. See Cécile Fabre, The Dignity of Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 271
(2000).
16. See DAVID ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL
FRAMEWORK 95–96 (2007).
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In a word, no. Nor does Webber appear to disagree. While
he does make claims, like the one quoted above, about a
legislature being a “necessary author of a right’s limitation,” that
necessity does not appear to be born of specificationism but
rather of completely separable considerations of political
legitimacy (which Webber also would have done well to defend
more assiduously). Even on Webber’s view, in other words,
constitutional specificationism does not itself require
majoritarian limitation. If we wish to isolate and assess the
merits of the specified conception of constitutional rights, and if
we wish to defend it, it is important not to overlook this. The
theory is obviously controversial quite apart from any affiliation
it may have with Waldron’s emphatic commitment to
majoritarian politics. That it stands against a view called “the
received approach” is evidence enough of that. Even if one lacks
misgivings about Waldron’s views—though I admit to
telegraphing some of mine in the previous paragraph—one can
recognize both that a theory is easier to defend the thinner it is
and that commitments like Waldron’s only weigh a theory down.
As an avowed partisan defending specificationism about rights,
and now following Webber in defending specified constitutional
rights, I want to give the theory every possible chance to
convince.

